









The limits of institutional convergence: why public sector outsourcing is less efficient 




















There is an argument in IPE that says firms, public agencies and third sector actors are 
converging on a new set of liberal cultural norms. (Boli and Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 1996; 
Meyer et al., 1997; Meyer et al., 2009; Fuenfschilling and Binz 2019). John W. Meyer 
contends that individuals globally have acquired a sense of equal agency through the 
liberalization of the social world, the worldwide expansion of education and the diffusion of 
scientific and social scientific thought. (Meyer 2010:4-8).  
 
Meyer and Bromley conclude that these changes in the self-understanding of agents has 
created a world-wide impetus towards more reasoning, reflexive ‘organizations’. The result is 
an individualized social order stabilized by science. (Bromley and Meyer 2013:366; 2017: 
940). While Meyer admits there are likely to be gaps between the actual and potential 
capacities of remade organizations in any given instance he expects these gaps to drive 
further progress: ‘The individuals and organizations so created now with the standing of 
agentic actors, commonly act on behalf of the great principles that empower their agency.’ 
(Meyer 2010: 14).  
 
There are clear affinities between these arguments for institutional isomorphism within an 
emerging ‘world society’, and the ‘Third Way’ political sociology of the 1990s from Anthony 
Giddens (1991, 1994) and Ulrich Beck (1997). Not only do they share an interest in the 
empowering cultural scripts of individuation. Meyer echoes Giddens’ expectation of a new 
‘life politics’ under-postmodernity in which a reflexive democracy will be brought into every 




I argue here that such generalized optimism is unwarranted and that to evaluate this process 
we need to do more than identify narrative convergence: we should investigate the qualities 
of the narratives themselves and the practices supposed to follow from them. To this end I 
take the principle observation of scientific rationality and turn it into a variable. Convergence 
theorists have sought to establish that scientific rationalism is an extensive development, so 
when we acknowledge that the quality of science varies we can add a qualifying condition to 
these claims. I suggest that scientific rationalism cannot be said to be in play without the 
application of the scientific method. This is not just a process of narrative discovery but one 
of justification through evidence. Unless agents engage in inductive review and refine their 
theories based on empirical evidence we are not in the world of scientific rationalism in any 
strict sense. Indeed, there is a huge potential to confuse science with ideology if we simply 
accept that the assertion and institutionalization of an interpretative narrative per se, in 
particular one that lays claim to be ‘scientific’, is proof of scientific rationalism. It is at best a 
thesis that stands on the water’s edge of science. At worst it is the abuse of scientistic 
language for purely political ends.  
 
As we will see this risk is also present in the social sciences when we lose sight of the 
contingent nature of any rationalist scheme that we might choose to apply. The presumption 
that a single form of universal rationality is in operation may lead to a fatal representational 
gap between the assertions of the given rationalist theory and the actual phenomenon that are 
the subject of study (Loasby, 2003: 290). If we look at the world through a single keyhole 
and forget that that’s what we’re doing then the world will start to look keyhole-shaped. 
 
To demonstrate how much the quality of a science will matter for the institutional functions 
supposed to follow from it I explore the performance of UK public sector outsourcing. 
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Bromley and Meyer cite the New Public Management (NPM) reforms begun in the 1980s as 
tailor-made to enable the multi-directional social learning between state agencies, businesses 
and third sector organizations most likely to produce liberal rationalist convergence (Bromley 
and Meyer 2017: 945). NPM reforms themselves were often justified in these terms, 
particularly by the New Left. Public sector outsourcing was supposed to combine the best of 
states, civil society and markets so it offers a critical test case for these claims.  
 
What the history that follows suggests, however, is that if there is institutional convergence at 
work here it is with Soviet enterprise planning. Far from empiricist scientific rationalism the 
neoclassical economics that justifies public sector outsourcing is a utopian script that bears 
more affinities to Leninism than to empirical political economic science, and this has real 
institutional consequences. Under both doctrines the state designs policy on the assumption 
that a welfare-optimizing and consistent economic rationality will operate in the governance 
of enterprises. In reality, however, all governmental systems in practice are made and evolve 
through the complex making of selective connections. It is the incompleteness of those 
connections that lets government adjust and innovate when they operate in dynamic and 
open-ended, i.e. social environments (Loasby 2003: 285). It follows that when we impose a 
closed-system rationalist doctrine on an open institutional system we are bound to create 
unanticipated consequences. Whether it is acknowledged or not, theoretical and policy-based 
representations of phenomena are always subject to Knightian uncertainty. 
 
The story so far… 
The repeated failure of public sector outsourcing in complex goods and services is not news, 
but a comparative economic systems perspective can help us understand why this strategy 
leads to chronic systemic rigidity and crises of governability. There are multiple forensic 
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accounts of failure in particular services or by particular agents, for example Allyson 
Pollock’s work on health system reform and Gill Plimmer’s monitoring of corporate 
governance failures at the Financial Times. Using multiple case-studies Andrew Bowman 
and colleagues have demonstrated that outsourcing has enabled unjustifiable profit-taking on 
mundane contracts, egregious profit-taking in complex contracts and financial extraction and 
poor performance from internally incoherent outsourcing conglomerates driven by ceaseless 
mergers and acquisitions. They also show how the gaming of permissive accountancy rules 
enables the acute financialisation of public service industry (PSI) firms (Bowman et al. 2015 
Chapter 1).  
 
Bowman et. al. draw on Middlemas (1979) to explain the resilience of outsourcing policy 
through the deepening co-dependence between the state and PSI firms. The latter can game 
the institutional framework and dominate a relationship in which the state is forced to play 
catch-up as things go wrong (Ibid. Chapter 2). They also explain how even major outsourcing 
fiascos are immunised from criticism because the supply-side policy logic dictates that the 
answer ‘is always more intelligent government and more competitive markets’ (Ibid: 29-30). 
Their conclusions that structural dependency is thus deepened represents my starting point, 
since my argument is that the origin of these ideas in utopian economics is both the source of 
this dysfunction and completely disables the process of empiricist review and reform: the 
opposite tendencies to those promised in the theory of liberal institutional convergence. 
 
Dexter Whitfield also shows how outsourcing has expanded in the face of a consistently high 
failure rates in short term and long-term, single service and multi-service strategic partnership 
contracts. Whitfield’s empirical research spans a wide range of supply-side reforms in Europe 
and the result is a powerful materialist explanation for their tenacity, as NPM remakes the 
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state in the interests of capital. For Whitfield ‘the process is designed so that each stage 
establishes the ideological, organisational and operational framework for the next element.’ 
(Whitfield, 2010:99-100). In this view policy resilience is explained by the powerful coalition 
of the political right with capital.  
 
To this I would add that this entrenchment does not have to be intentional to nevertheless 
occur because the dynamics of entrenchment are rooted in the closed-system logic of 
neoclassical economics. It is in the DNA of the narrative that the only ideologically coherent 
response to failure is acceleration: to double-down on the institutional project on the basis 
that the more ‘pure’ the regime the more its virtues must emerge. This liability is intrinsic in 
utopian economic ideologies that insist on dependable laws of motion within a closed system 
ontology of the economy. The implication is that these systems become unspooled only once 
only once the disorder they create has spread to every dimension of their activity: when the 
entropy is total. 
 
Through the lens of comparative economic systems we can see that when it comes to the 
practical mechanics of government Leninism and neoliberalism justify a nearly identical 
methodology of output-planning, quantification, forecasting and target-setting. But such 
dependence on quantitative techniques (as distinct from their ecumenical use) only makes 
sense in a closed-system, machine world of consistently rational agents, calculable risk and 
dependable laws of economic motion. It follows that when you combine the target-setting 
world of the state under NPM with the outsourcing contract as the junction of instruction, 
control and reward, public sector outsourcing recreates many of the pathologies of Soviet 
enterprise planning, but now in a capitalist form. It is not simply that the state is forced to 
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play catch up: the neoliberal state gets locked into bargaining games with enterprises it can 
never win as it waits in vain for the promises of doctrine to kick in.  
 
By focusing on the underlying economic ontology behind these reforms my aim is to shed 
more light on the power of ideas in this process. As the Brezhnev era showed, the more 
determined the embrace of a closed-system orthodoxy in the face of its failure the more 
dysfunctional the new institutional arrangements, the more powerfully embedded the new 
interests, the more startling the unanticipated consequences are bound to become. My thesis 
is that there is a ratchet effect of sharpening contradiction between methodology and reality 
on the application of policies that derive from a closed-system ontology of the political 
economy. It follows that neoliberal reforms of the state are not sustainable as a case of liberal 
institutional convergence based on scientific rationalism. 
 
When you strip away the liberal-technocratic rhetoric around NPM, tax-payer funded 
outsourcing requires the central planning of private business or third sector actors. Moreover, 
the state does not wither away as the ‘organizational’ universe of convergent players expands. 
On the contrary, the added complexity that has come with the techniques of NPM has caused 
the state to become more complex and expensive than it used to be (Dunleavy et. al. 2006: 
470). Outsourcing has accelerated across advanced capitalist economies but an assessment 
across 15 EU states found no association with reduced public sector expenditure or 
employment (Alonso, Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes, 2013). The following sections try to explain 
why. 
 
Three of the most important insights that come from historical institutionalism are that 
political conflicts matter; that organization structures the mobilization of interests, and that 
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there are path-dependencies in institutional reform (Hall and Taylor 1996). In what follows I 
apply each of those lenses to show how, as in Soviet enterprise planning, outsourcing builds 
in a ratchet effect of policy failures. These flow from the lack of empirical basis in the 
neoclassical theory behind these reforms, from the effective suppression of political conflict 
and critique under the bipartisan consensus for the New Public Management, and from the 
inhibition of policy-learning that follows from the circularity of neoclassical argument.  
 
This is ideology not science 
The policies associated with the New Public Management are built on a utopian not a 
scientific basis. Neoclassical economics is a grand ideological theory: it provides a view of 
what human beings are like, a view of how society works, and in the constitutional 
economics that has sprung from it, a view of an ideal world (Edwards, 2007). It is founded on 
hypothetical-deductive assumptions about reality not based in observable fact. Mirowski 
records how the new neoclassical economists lifted wholesale the axioms of late nineteenth 
century energy physics onto a terrain where they had no such empirical foundation.  
 
The only model of human motivation simple enough to fit the borrowed mechanical 
metaphors from the start was that of ‘utilitarian man’ (Mirowski, 1989; Lawson, 2013). Its 
appeal was not as a theory of mind but as a pragmatic solution to a technical difficulty. To 
assert mathematics as a scientific system of economic analysis the neoclassicists needed an 
economic agent with consistent and reliable properties. Without a ‘homo economicus’ it 
would be impossible to build dependable axioms about economic behaviour. They could 
equate what they called utility with the formalisms of energy and thereby ‘portray the market 
as deterministic and as law governed as the rolling of a ball to the bottom of a bowl.’ 




To establish predetermined rules of the economy neoclassicists had to depict it as a sealed, 
predetermined, isolated system: a closed system ontology. As Veblen had warned however, 
economists who deployed these methods could address neither systemic complexity or 
change in real, open-ended political economic systems (Veblen, 1898). This approach has 
long been criticized as unrealistic both by the more skeptical wing of neoclassical economics, 
with its acknowledgement of bounded rationality, informational asymmetries and market 
failures, and by those heterodox schools that reject the closed system ontology altogether in 
favor of an historical-processual understanding. But even ‘second-best-world’ neoclassicists 
who at some level recognize that social reality is open-ended remain critically hamstrung so 
long as they prefer the deductive mathematical approach and the closed-system ontology on 
which it depends (Lawson, 2013). What second-best-world neoclassicists call ‘market failure’ 
is always a failure to complete the full set of connections that is presumed to ultimately 
pertain (Loasby, 2003: 291). In practice however, you can mend as many points of market 
failure as you like but outside of a small-world, unchanging and isolated market you can 
never close a complete circle of connections. Moreover, the focus on micro-economic 
connections to the exclusion of empirical analysis around interests, ideas and institutions is 
likely to draw your attention away from the more obviously dysfunctional imbalances in 
institutional powers now underway. 
 
Neoclassical economics as a practical reform blueprint thus places fatal constraints on 
representation and hence on the scope for adaptive learning and correction following the 
processes of trial, error and review: the scientific method. As Fleetwood explains, the process 
of abstraction is necessary in any kind of model but ‘it involves focusing upon certain causal 
mechanisms without assuming the non-existence, or non-influence of other mechanisms not 
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in focus at this stage of the analysis.’ Moreover, while causal mechanisms can be idealised 
they must not be fictionalized. ‘If this occurs, then claims, concepts, ideas, theories, or 
conclusions drawn at an early stage might become null and void at a later stage.’ (Fleetwood, 
2017: 1.4). As our case will show, when neoclassical assumptions are applied without 
acknowledgement of their utopian roots then policy-makers are in for some serious surprises. 
 
To understand why, under the New Public Management, you will create many of the worst 
potential pathologies of government and business it is helpful to register the circularity of the 
first-best-world variant of the neoclassical doctrine behind it. This says that if multiple 
utopian conditions, including fully rational, utility maximizing and fully informed economic 
actors operate in pure competitive markets under the auspices of a neutral, ‘night-watchman’ 
state then you will maximize efficiency. The promise is that by implementing supply-side 
strategies the political-bureaucratic state will become more retractable as markets ‘regain’ 
their supposedly automatic efficiency. That assumption that market efficiency rises as the 
taken out of the way is derived from the general equilibrium, unique and stable, presumed to 
ultimately pertain: a scenario demonstrated to be formally impossible, let alone practical by 
Sonnenschein, Mantel and Debreu already in the 1970s. Indeed, the story is fundamentally 
incoherent, since ‘making contracts like making markets, is a process of forming selection 
connections and is therefore, incompatible with the notion of a system which is already fully 
connected [hence] there is no role for markets within a general equilibrium’ (Loasby, 2003, 
292). 
 
From the perspective of comparative economic systems the neoclassical approach has more 
in common with Leninism than with the political economic doctrines of the post-war era. 
Keynesianism, Rehn Meidner and Ordoliberalism all accepted Knightian uncertainty and 
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imperfect rationality as givens and combined deductive and inductive reasoning. The 
affinities between the supply-side economics of the last forty years and Leninism are rooted 
in their common dependence on a closed system, machine model of the political economy 
and on the hyper-rationality, be it socialist or utilitarian, on which their analyses are built. 
Indeed in the socialist-calculation debate the socialist economists from the 1930s had claimed 
the Soviet system was the Walrasian auctioneer made real (Bockman and Eyal 2002). Public 
sector outsourcing offers a window into how these affinities play out, and the remainder of 
this paper draws from the UK experience as a leading ‘market’ in this field.  
 
The effective suppression of political conflict  
Historical institutionalists worry that the focus on cultural change in sociological 
institutionalism can make it ‘politically bloodless’(Hall and Taylor 1996: 21). And both 
Meyer and Giddens tend to ascribe the decline of the old institutional order to a spontaneous 
emanation of a changing society in an era of global cultural rationalization (Meyer 2013: 369; 
Giddens 1994: 12). In practice supply-side reforms were induced through a series of highly 
contested and radical government decisions on the institutional ground and those decisions 
were rooted in utopian political-economic ideas. New Public Management reforms at their 
broadest have drawn from multiple schools (Gruening 2001). However, its key policies - for 
the disaggregation of large public sector hierarchies, for competition among providers and for 
pecuniary incentivisation (Dunleavy et al. 2006: 470) - were all rooted in the public choice 
diagnoses and free-market prescriptions of the Virginia and Chicago Schools of neoclassical 
economics.  
 
Public choice theory claimed the capitalist crises of the 1970s and 1980s were caused by state 
failure as a monopoly supplier of goods and services and monopsonist purchaser of other 
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goods and services (Hindmoor, 2006). This critique was based on the neoclassical methods 
that until the late 1950s had been applied only to decision-making in markets. Carrying the 
methodology across to political decision-making drove devastating conclusions about the 
state that are actually artefacts of the method itself. To answer their questions around why the 
state had grown in the post-war era, public choice theorists simply asserted that politicians, 
bureaucrats and their voters are self-interested economic actors like any others in a 
marketplace. By declaring that public officials no less homo economicus than economic 
agents in the ‘private’ sector the New Right could reconceive of democratic politics as a 
process in which politicians are entrepreneurs who compete to gain control over the resources 
of a monopoly: the state. To increase their fiefdoms self-interested politicians and bureaucrats 
will generate policies most likely to appease self-interested voters in the market for votes. By 
this logic democracy is doomed to crowd itself out. The demand for state privileges by self-
seeking voters will never be satisfied until the state becomes totalitarian. Bureaucrats, as in 
any monopoly firm, will tend only towards exploitative price-making and general budgetary 
greed. A responsible politician will strip the state of its powers to intervene in a ‘free’ market: 
the only ‘honest’ mechanism in a rationally selfish world. 
 
The micro-foundations behind this thesis are philosophically extreme. They assume a society 
of individuals who deploy a cold calculation of the costs and benefits of their actions and do 
so with perfect information about their options. The diagnosis insists we are super-humanly 
rational around our immediate interests but witless about social or constitutional 
considerations and unmoved by ethics as distinct from material gain. It assumes a voting 
population unable to tell the difference between the NHS and communism. It engages an 
antidote fallacy in pitching the failures of democratic politics understood as a market for 
taxpayer-funded privileges against the alternative of presumptively perfect market for private, 
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impure and public goods. The metaphor of the state as monopoly firm is a fictional rather 
than an idealized representation: where a failing firm enforces a limited reallocation of labor 
and capital a failing state collapses the historically effective mechanisms for democratic 
representation, the stability of capitalism, social integration and public order as such 
(Christensen and Shaxson 2015). 
 
Following the neoliberal turn of the 1980s the promise of liberal organizational convergence 
thus became a useful political idea. For the New Left in particular the hybridization of public 
service provision provided a progressive version of the new economic orthodoxy. To 
combine the equity virtues of the public sector with the efficiency virtues of the private sector 
through the experimental marketization of the state suggested ‘lesson-learning’ by a left 
forced to defend its aspirations against this new critique of democracy. The ‘Third Way’ 
hybridization of organizations promised consensus rather than the radicalism of the New 
Right, which put outright privatization and public spending cuts to the fore. The Clintonite 
New Democrats followed by Blairite New Labour rejected the post-war interventions in 
capitalism in favor of its ‘taming’. They determined on a technocratic modernizing project 
that would render the supply-side revolution more socially inclusive. They sought to increase 
investment in technology and experiment with the new NPM by introducing it piecemeal into 
the welfare state, most notably in education and health. In this they failed to recognize that 
neoclassical economics was a grand narrative booby-trapped by utopianism. 
 
The supply-side reforms that followed, from the bipartisan acceleration of public sector 
outsourcing to the agencification of the civil service to privatization, all assumed that if you 
shrank the state and brought business practices into what remained of it you would get the 
best of states and markets: a lean and more efficient bureaucracy and an innovative, 
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productive and socially conscientious enterprise culture. ‘Competitive’ provision through 
outsourcing promised increased user choice and equal access guaranteed through taxpayer-
funding. It promised an escape from unsustainable public debt and, in the construction of a 
whole new public service industry, a spur to employment and economic growth. Party 
political competition in supply-sider states would henceforth focus on disagreements from 
within the neoclassical narrative. At its most critical the New Left considered how to mend 
individual market failures to complete the purely hypothetical set of connections in a system 
that only presumptively tended towards a stable equilibrium in production and allocation. 
 
Many scholars have shown how neoliberalism consequently tended to shut down effective 
economic choice and representation in electoral politics and with it, the vitality of the party 
political system (e.g., Andrew Gamble, Thomas Ferguson, Colin Hay, Peter Mair, Chantal 
Mouffe, Lia Ypi, Jonathan White, Paul Pierson, Jacob Hacker, Jonathan Hopkin and Mark 
Blyth). Mouffe in particular has focused on the delusion of social consensus under 
neoliberalism: on the complacency of the idea that a comfortable retreat into a privatised 
politics was a universal option. She argued that the vision of a ‘post-political’ future failed to 
acknowledge the inescapable reality that conflicting interests under capitalism could only be 
reconciled through an active politics.  
 
Mouffe called out this complacency as demonstrating quasi-religious faith in individual 
rationalism. As such it differs strongly from the belief in the scientific method that 
characterised classical liberalism and social democracy. It likewise overturned the Burkean 
emphasis on precaution and practical learning in one-nation Toryism.  Indeed the explicit aim 
of those who drove the new orthodoxy was ‘the establishment of a world “beyond left and 
right”, “beyond hegemony”, “beyond sovereignty” and “beyond antagonism”’ (Mouffe 2011: 
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Introduction): in essence, beyond critique. These were undoubtedly democracies and not 
totalitarian states, but bipartisan consensus over the idea that the market was morally and 
functionally superior to the state created a tenacious analytical monoculture. 
 
The adoption of the neoclassical narrative was a political act. It cannot be compared (as it has 
been in the constructivist case), with the scientific method as adopted by environmental 
NGOs, for example. In the environmental sciences and organizations committed to 
environmental protection, operational actions and ethics are constantly calibrated against new 
empirical data. Not just practice but underlying theory are constantly reviewed and revised. 
In the meantime the neoclassical theory behind the most important supply-side reforms, from 
tax competition to financial market deregulation, originated in extreme-end-of-theoretical-
spectrum economic models too reductively stylized - too fictionalized - to be calibrated 
against social reality at all. While the hypothetical-deductive method is productive for the 
methodological sciences like logic, mathematics and statistics, to use nothing but deductive 
reasoning to define real-world problems and draw analytical conclusions for policy from that 
is a recipe for trouble, and so it has proved. (McCloskey 2005: 90). Outsourcing is a pillar of 
neoliberal state reform, so how has it performed in the UK, a pioneer of the supply-side 
revolution for over forty years?  
 
The mobilization of resources 
UK developments started in earnest with the introduction of Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering in local governments in the late 1980s. The Local Government Acts of 1988 and 
1992 began a government strategy that grew from the buying in of simple goods and services 
to the system-wide outsourcing of complex public goods and services by central and local 
government (‘outsourcing’ hereafter). Outsourcing since the 1990s progressed through 
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competitive tendering, partnership working (particularly in the uses of Public Finance 
Initiatives), strategic-commissioning and prime-contracting (Bovaird, 2016). Central 
government outsourcing accelerated under New Labour, from £37bn to £67b, and nearly 
doubled again to £120 billion under the Conservative-Liberal coalition of 2010-2015. Since 
the ‘legitimate use of force in a given territory’ is the classic Weberian definition of ‘the 
state’ the post-2010 rise of outsourcing in justice, welfare and defense indicates the profound 
character of these changes (Plimmer 2015). 
 
The coalition government also eased the process: private sector companies who took over 
public sector staff were no longer required to hire employees on the same terms after 2010. In 
October 2013 it was made easier for public servants to carry their pensions over to the private 
sector as tens of thousands of staff were transferred to private sector management. The 
acceleration after 2015 made the UK the world’s second largest outsourcing market after the 
USA. This had been propelled by the Confederation of British Industry’s Public Services 
Strategy Board, whose 2011 ‘Open Public Services’ White paper proposed government open 
as many public services as possible to private provision. It promised that by opening up £280 
billion of services, efficiency savings of 11 per cent would save government £22.6 billion 
(Plimmer 2015). Acceleration was not a spontaneous emanation of grassroots cultural 
change.  
 
The National Audit Office estimated that by 2014-2015 UK government was spending £242 
billion on private sector contracts: some £50 billion in finance capital for the funding of 
ongoing PFI contracts with the remaining £192 billion split in half between outsourcing 
contracts for provision and standard procurement. This amounted to 31per cent of total 
government spending (NAOa, 2016).
  
By 2014 the UK public service industry accounted for 
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6 per cent of GDP and 1.6 million staff: over three times the number of Whitehall civil 
servants (Wilks, 2014).  
 
Dixon and Hood have established that over the last thirty years reported UK administration 
costs have nevertheless risen by 40 per cent in constant prices despite a third of civil service 
numbers being cut over the same thirty year period. Total public spending over the same 
period doubled while the indicators for quality and fairness in service delivery deteriorated. 
Complaints and judicial challenges soared and running costs were driven up in outsourced 
domains in particular (Dixon and Hood 2015: pp.70-79). A 2014 parliamentary Public 
Accounts Committee inquiry into outsourcing was damning.  
 
Government is clearly failing to manage performance across the board and to achieve 
the best for citizens out of the contracts into which they have entered...So far, the 
contracting out of services has led to the evolution of privately-owned public 
monopolies, who largely, or in some cases wholly, rely on taxpayers’ money for their 
income. The state is then constrained in finding alternatives where a big private 
company fails (HC777, 2014).  
 
Lively competition was meant to drive up quality, but 73 per cent of procurement spending 
had been awarded to public service industry multinationals (HC884, 2016). In 2014 more 
than £4bn was spent on four companies alone and this raised National Audit Office concerns 
that firms like Serco, Capita, Atos and G4S were ‘too big to fail’, despite their repeated 
dereliction in service delivery. Outsourcing also undermined democratic accountability as it 
moved public spending behind the cloak of commercial confidentiality. So how should we 
account for the ongoing failure and intensification of outsourcing even in the face of critical 
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review? What are the path dependent dynamics that play out once the policy is implemented? 
And what role do neoclassical ideas play in protecting the newly vested interests in this 
process even as their performance remains poor?  
 
The analytical sins of omission 
In the liberal convergence thesis the public service goals of the state become constitutive 
cultural components of the new public service ‘organizations’. The ‘paternalist’ post-war 
bureaucracies are replaced by an individualized, client-centered organizations in which 
providers and clients see themselves as equal agents in the universalist image. The argument 
says the service ethos is not threatened through these reforms, merely ‘stateness’. The 
neoclassical case for outsourcing says market-based solutions generate better outcomes than 
public systems because the governance of private organizations is more transparent, flexible 
and disciplined to seek efficiency by competition. So where does outsourcing go wrong? The 
contention here is ‘at the start’: at that fundamental point of disagreement in contemporary 
economics discussed earlier. 
 
The basic fallacy is the neoclassical assumption that an efficient public services market can 
be achieved through competition between informed actors. Under perfect competition in 
neoclassical thought all firms sell an identical product, all firms are price-takers (they cannot 
influence the market price of their product), all players have complete information about the 
product being sold and the prices of all other firms, resources are perfectly mobile and firms 
can enter or exit the market without cost. Even under the neoclassical understanding of 
imperfect competition the implication is that market failures can be resolved to complete 
enough connections to make a public services market operate more effectively than a non-




As in Leninism the dependence on rationalism is total but the requirement for perfect 
informational capacity is now situated at the individual level. Each rational actor will know 
past, present and future prices or accurately approximate these over time in a second-best 
world, (whereas under Leninism the prices are administered via the central planning agency). 
This is the machinery that gets us to ‘general equilibrium’: the theory that Sonnenschein, 
Mantel and Debreu established collapses with the addition of anything approaching 
complexity and hence realism to the model (Ackerman 2002). 
 
Even within its own terms this scheme is less internally coherent than Leninism. At the 
equilibrium point in which supply exactly matched demand then firms logically make zero 
profit, which begs the question of why a utility-maximising firm would ever bother to 
achieve it. Perfect competition is obviously impossible but the idea is made more plausible 
because second-best-world neoclassical economists use it as a heuristic device to allow them 
to explore how it fails. But the implication that those missing connections can be restored in 
practice to any kind of stable and fully efficient completion is precisely as erroneous as the 
first-best version of this story. The ideological benchmarks for supply-side policy are 
nevertheless set. It is supposed that all firms need to create high economic performance are to 
the greatest degree possible, good information, complete mobility of resources, including 
labour and capital, and minimised costs of market entry or exit. Regulation and state 
interventions, including tax, are understood as an external cost burden or ‘distortion’. 
Liberate the factors of production and the automaticity of the market will supposedly 
transpire. It follows that the more the state ‘gets out of the way’ the lower the competitive, 




To sustain the mechanical omnipotence and approaching automaticity of the market in this 
view the firm as an organization - as an institution - must be impotent by default. As 
Lazonick points out its nearest real world approximation is the sweatshop. This construction 
rewrites the actual history of capitalist development backwards both in relation to the state 
and the firm. It wishes away the history of inescapable market failures in the production of 
public and impure public goods and the uploading of their provision to the public sphere over 
time. In relation to the firm, as Lazonick explains, developed markets in products, finance, 
labour and land are the outcomes not the causes of development. The idea of competitive 
product markets and by extension, of competitive public service markets, simply presumes 
the existence of businesses with the capacity to produce products of a quality that people 
want at a price consumers - in this case the state - are willing to pay. How such firms actually 
emerge and innovate is something economic history teaches us requires the active investment 
of households that invest in the wellbeing and education of children, of states that invest in 
education and health beyond the limits of the household budget, along with scientific and 
engineering research, physical infrastructure, transport, communications, energy systems etc. 
This investment triad also requires the active engagement of businesses themselves, in 
people, equipment, new technology and design (Lazonick, 2017). The supply-side revolution 
thus drives the state into retreat in exactly those areas where it has played a historically 
critical role in development. And yet, as the coalition Prime Minister, David Cameron, put it 
in 2011: ‘From now on diversity is the default in our public services…instead of having to 
justify why it makes sense to introduce competition…the state will have to justify why it 
makes sense to run a monopoly’ (Cameron, 2011).  
 
The contradictions arise as soon as you consider the prospective market for collective goods 
because it has significant differences to the theoretical market for private goods. In most 
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commercial transactions around simple goods and services it is relatively realistic to assume a 
clear customer and a clear supplier, though there are significant challenges around 
management and scale economies even here. Nevertheless, in a theoretical market for simple 
private goods the product or service is poor the consumer can move on. Performance can be 
effectively assessed by consumer satisfaction with the service and its price. But in ‘public 
service markets’ there may be the following difficulties, as neatly summarized by the Institute 
for Government: 
 
 Lack of clarity about who the customer is – there may be a range of parties with 
conflicting needs (to take the probation service, is the customer the offender, the 
victim, the government, the courts, the society?) 
 Few (or no) providers with a track record in supplying that service, and barriers to 
entry may be high (e.g. training costs, lack of experience) 
 No established way of determining a fair price (what’s the outcome to be priced? 
Reoffending rates, inspection ratings, feedback from users?) 
 No easy way to measure performance (causes of reoffending rates, for example, are 
complex, but an important measure of performance,  
 All markets have to contend with competition and company law, but public service 
markets also need additional regulation to reflect the public interest and often 
complex statutory obligations around a given service. 
 If performance is poor, a lack of alternative suppliers makes it difficult to switch 
provider. (Institute for Government a)  
 
So what happens when government outsources its multifaceted and dynamic service tasks 
regardless? The operative conceptions of state, market, firm and customer all prove to be 
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fatally unreal in the prevailing ‘governing science’. The question of ‘who the customer really 
is’ encouraged theoretic analyses (e.g. Le Grand, 1991) and commissioning models to focus 
on non-choice versus choice environments for end-users of services. Insofar as the state 
existed in these models it was depicted as an abstract sovereign, single-shot ‘setter’ of a 
theoretic-deductive game within which the dynamics of choice and competition would play 
out thereafter, somehow autonomously. In practice the only actual market relationship here is 
that for outsourcing procurement, in which the state or state agencies remain not just the sole 
customer (Crouch, 2015), but also the ultimately liable party for service delivery, failures and 
their costs. Representation of the state’s continuous role is missing in the theory and when we 
recognize that the state is the real market customer here and not the end users we then have to 
recognize that the state is not a standard economic agent. 
 
So what of the representation of ‘the market’? Advocates argue that the potential for 
outsourcing to reduce costs and improve performance emanates from the high-powered 
incentives for efficiency provided by market competition plus the discipline of the capital 
market, where owners require transparency and high performance (Jensen and Stonecash, 
2005:768; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). In practice however, given that the outsourced work 
is frequently to run public assets or to provide and manage teams of essential personnel, the 
economies of scale mean that only large businesses will tend to be eligible. Further barriers to 
market entry for SMEs include lack of experience with government contracting on this scale 
and the punitive costs of low-chance competitive tenders for smaller or social enterprises. As 
a result public service markets are characterized by oligopoly or monopoly: indeed if SMEs 
can get involved it tends to be at the mercy of practically monopsonist multinational public 




Within this context of weak market competition the further challenges that all need resolving 
around the values of the service, its pricing and performance measurement, around company 
law, contractual regulation and switching provider all depend on the quality of the 
outsourcing contract and its oversight. For outsourcing to work this agreement between the 
state as customer and the public service industry contractor needs to operate as the effective 
junction of instruction, control and reward. When you unpack the asymmetries in the 
bargaining and monitoring positions between these contractual ‘players’ and the 
misalignment of their respective incentives however, it becomes clear that even an 
application of second-best-world neoclassical reasoning leaves none of the first-best-world 
promises intact.  
 
Complexity and incomplete contracts 
Transaction cost and contract theory tend to agree that complex and dynamic contracts are 
unavoidably incomplete (Williamson, 2002: 174, 188; 2017): as such both fields are 
dominated by second-best-world neoclassical analyses. Both fields tend to agree that complex 
contracts are incomplete by reason of bounded rationality. This means that each actor wants 
to act rationally (understood as making informed cost-benefit analyses of their options), but 
they are necessarily constrained by the uncertain, contingent, complex or unquantifiable 
character of the task at hand. Both tend to conclude that the higher the complexity and 
contingency of contracts the greater their incompleteness and risks of ‘satisficing’ behavior 
on the contractor’s part. In contrast to government procurement for standardized goods, most 
public service tasks carry some and frequently all of these characteristics. 
 
Both fields would duly note that incomplete contracts understood as ‘promises to behave’ are 
hardly self-enforcing because of opportunism. Moreover, the possibility that courts could 
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resolve conflicts after the fact is limited by the same non-verifiability issues that cause the 
buyer’s problems in the first place i.e. the fact that most of the behaviors within these tasks 
are unobserved and difficult to codify (Williamson, 1993: 93). Once such an incomplete 
contract is signed, however, a government hands its control typically to a monopoly business, 





When any unforeseen contingency arises the government will have to approach the contractor 
to renegotiate. This gives profit-seeking companies the opportunity to raise their price. 
(Williamson, 1976; Schmalensee, 1979). The switching costs around government services are 
also likely to be prohibitive, assuming an alternative provider is even available (Jensen and 
Stonecash, ibid 775). The same risks attend un-negotiated cost overruns. In theory these 
could be penalized by loss of contract but in practice the financial and organizational, not to 
mention the political cost of changing provider are typically prohibitive. The upshot is that 
the state has a low credible threat of exit. The government-buyer will find itself over a barrel 
in the face of contractors who rationally operate according to a plain text reading of the 
contract. Such leverage is likely to make financial savings at the beginning of the contract 
disappear over time, to be replaced by significantly higher costs (Williamson, 1976).  
 
Even from the ‘second-best-world’ neoclassical perspective therefore it is clear that ‘market 
failures’ in outsourcing are rife and likely to prove insurmountable. Public service markets 
prove naturally dominated by monopoly or oligopoly firms left relatively immune from the 
presumptive disciplinary mechanisms of market competition. Chronic information problems 
arise from radical uncertainty or complexities in requirements, and from asymmetries around 
who holds accurate information between buyer and seller. ‘Hold-up’ problems arise because 
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relationship–specific investments encourage the contractor to exploit the loss of bargaining 
power. Last but not least, the negative spillovers that emerge are exceptionally socially 
damaging. Difficult to codify tasks often intrinsic to a given public service are rationally 
sloughed off by private providers and families, volunteers, charities and other public services 
are left to pick up the pieces. As interdependent services come under satisficing corporate 
performance systemic failures become inevitable.  
 
When we step away from the closed-system promises of neoclassical economics the illusion 
disappears that even a partial completion of market failures must amount to a systemic 
efficiency gain because even critical neoclassical accounts can tell little us about the system-
wide redistributions of political-economic power that come with these policies. Apply 
historical institutionalist insights about how reforms create new institutional path 
dependencies however, and we can start to represent that bigger picture. When we do this it 
becomes apparent that outsourcing offers a close replay of Soviet enterprise planning, 
including its tendency to create a ratchet effect of systemic failure. The isomorphism is 
rooted in the establishment of an asymmetric power relationship between the state and the 
enterprises managed by it and in the hegemony of a closed-system economic ideology that 
inhibits critical analysis of the dynamics that ensue. Both systems create vested institutional 
interests that are highly socially dysfunctional; co-pendency between state and enterprise and 
the creation of firms too essential to the state to fail. This is a tried and tested recipe for 
chronic rent-seeking at the public’s expense.  
 
The reinvention of Soviet enterprise planning by other means 
In practice public service industry firms as ‘firms’ bear a marked resemblance to Soviet state 
owned enterprises. Like Soviet SOEs they operate in a doom loop of low incentives for 
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consummate performance, high incentives for satisficing performance and a lack of effective 
disciplinary mechanisms. Central oversight is disabled because of contractual 
incompleteness, no, or at best weak competitive pressure and because the necessity of 
unbroken production gives firms leverage over the procuring state agency. The isomorphism 
is not exact: Soviet planning issues were primarily about private goods and complex 
outsourcing primarily concerns impure and pure public goods. The affinities between PSI 
firms and Soviet SOEs are nevertheless extensive and concentrated in the relationship 
between the managerial state and the enterprise. Both systems depend on imperative planning 
and top down evaluation criteria that create perverse incentives around innovation and the 
quality and cost of production (Ellman, 2015: Chapter 2). Both systems are characterized by 
asymmetries in information in the planning contract at year ‘t’. The state is then dragged into 
bargaining games that it cannot win in years t+1, t+2, ad infinitum because bargaining power 
is only increasingly in the enterprise’s hands. Governments who outsource complex work are 
duly beset by what the critical economics of communism called ‘soft budget constraint’. 
 
As Janos Kornai explained in The Socialist System (1992), ‘The concept of ‘budget 
constraint’ is familiar from the microeconomic theory of the household: the sum available to 
a decision maker places a constraint on the consumer's spending that he or she can choose to 
incur.’ So what happens, asks Kornai, if a state-owned firm’s spending exceeds its budget 
constraint? And what happens if this is a regular occurrence (as it is highly likely to be under 
incomplete contracts)? Kornai identified four forms of regular assistance, for which we can 





‘Soft subsidy. The adjective ‘soft’ implies that this is not a case of a state subsidy at a 
level expressly laid down for a longer period. The amount of the subsidy is the subject 
of bargaining…Negotiations are made either in advance, before the amount of subsidy 
has been laid down, or during and after the period covered by the subsidy, to improve 
on the sum promised in advance.  
 
In outsourcing permissive bargaining is the most likely response towards uncodifiable 
contingencies and contractual overspend within incomplete contracts, at least until those costs 
become a source of political scandal or prove financially unsustainable, at which point the 
same problems are likely to begin with another provider and after high switching costs. 
Bowman et al identify multiple instances of significant direct and indirect subsidy in major 
UK contracts (Ibid. Chapters 3 and 4). 
 
 2. Soft taxation. ‘Soft’ does not imply that the amount of net income the firm is 
obliged to pay in (the ‘tax’) is low. It means the amount is subject to prior and/or 
subsequent bargaining. The more possible it is to ‘beat down’ the firm's taxation 
by pressure or pleading, the softer it is.  
 
Tax-avoidant ‘tax planning’ is the likely primary route for large companies to soften their 
liabilities within ‘competitive’, that is to say low and lax corporate tax schemes, another 
plank of the supply-side revolution. In 2012, for example, the PSI conglomerates Atos 
and G4S apparently paid no corporation tax at all, owing to ‘tax planning’ (Bowers, 
2013).  However, bargaining is again undoubtedly part of this picture. Under its policy of 
jurisdictional competitiveness the UK government introduced selective discretion into the 
tax authority. The shift from the convention of strict enforcement to one of ‘partnership’ 
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with large corporations increased the regulator’s discretion but only in one direction since 
there were simultaneously deep cuts in agency capacity. (PSCU and TJN 2015). For 
supply-siders this was an active ideological choice whereas for the Soviets soft taxes 
were a feature of the demoralised ‘bargained socialism’ of the Brezhnev years, when 
Soviet governments had all but abandoned hope in an efficient planning system. Soft 
taxation is also matched by a capitalist version of… 
 
 3. Soft credit. On the one hand under the Soviet system, ‘soft’ refers to the 
situation where the credit contract with the bank does not follow general, uniform 
principles, but a firm in trouble can ‘whine’ for credit that actually includes a 
veiled grant.  
 
The functional equivalent for large PSI firms in private financial markets is that credit is 
achieved without innovation or value-creating development but simply to gain new 
incomes streams via mergers and acquisitions. UK PSI firms have made massive use of 
debt financing to expand through M&A activity enabled by highly permissive tax write-
offs against borrowing. This occurs even though the increased gearing ratio for the 
company (the ratio of debt to shareholder equity) makes it more vulnerable to changes in 
discount rates, growth rates and cash flow forecasts. Not only that, but the tendency of the 
stock market to cheerlead for mergers and acquisitions drives conglomerates to enter new 
sectors where they lack competence and knowledge (Bowman Ibid. 58).  
 
In a world of notably elastic accounting rules, as Leaver has pointed out, large PSI firms 
are also increasingly levering up against the future either by securitizing their future 
income streams, using special dividends to holding companies in tax havens or by over-
29 
 
optimistically booking profits based on forecasts and estimates. This last strategy was 
particularly available to outsourcing companies involved in long term contracts as they 
could book current profits on the basis of total forecast profits, adjusted for which stage 
they could demonstrate they were at in the contract cycle. As an accounting trick this 
‘pulls income from the future’ which may not reflect the actual cash-flows paid in the 
contract. If firms get these forecasts wrong and book a large impairment which 
destabilizes their business, the government is demonstrably likely to bail them out or 
adjust the contract to the benefit of the company (Leaver, 2018).  
 
This reliance on forecasting is itself an artefact of a closed system ontology of the 
economy and the embedded concept of ergodicity: the idea that the past is a reliable 
statistical shadow of the future (Davidson 2007). As such it repeats the forecasting and 
taut planning failures long suffered through the Soviet enterprise system, but now with 
added financial incentives to do so. There is an additional opportunity for creative 
accounting in large infrastructural projects, like hospital trusts. As Hellowell and Vecchi 
have shown, payments to the private operator are likely to be indexed in the contract to 
the Retail Price Index that is typically higher than other measures such as the GDP 
deflator. This means that simple indexing charges in most years will provide a real terms 
increase in the unitary charge (Hellowell and Vecchi, 2015, 529). 
 
Finally, Soviet firms could benefit from what Kornai called ‘soft administrative pricing’. 
 
 4. Soft administrative pricing… A significant proportion of prices in a classical 
socialist economy are set administratively. These seem to be prices dictated 
bureaucratically to the firm, but, in fact, they can be ‘softened’ by vertical 
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bargaining with the price authorities. There is advance bargaining: the goal of the 
firm, branch directorate, or ministry is to make the pricing authority 
‘acknowledge’ the costs in the price, however low the efficiency of production. 
There is subsequent bargaining also. A price rise is sought if extra costs have been 
incurred. In some other cases a disguised price rise is made. The quality assumed 
when the price was set is lowered, or a good material is substituted by an inferior 
material, or certain finishing processes are omitted (Kornai, 1992: 141-144).  
 
This scenario plays out within public service industry outsourcing where prices and 
processes are set by the valuation of target indicators priced ‘administratively’. The risk 
of price softening to the corporate advantage is high where the state has invested heavily 
in the contract or there are big costs attached to any disruption of the service, or high cost 
for supplier substitution (given the new opportunity for hold-up): that is to say, under the 
typical conditions.  
 
Between their initial operating conditions and the state’s lack of effective disciplinary 
measures over time PSI firms and Soviet SOEs have far more in common with each other 
than with the competitive enterprises of the neoclassical imaginary. The outsourcing contract 
operates as a form of imperative planning instruction and not as an ‘indicative plan’ to be 
considered; prices are predominantly administrative and soft; contracts are typically long, 
incomplete and exit is punitively expensive both financially, organizationally and politically; 
the continuation of production is essential, hence government operates under chronic soft-
budget constraints. The relationship is intrinsically politicized: in the light of chronic 
contractual failures in the UK the Cabinet Office now operates as the direct interface with 
major outsourcing companies (HC777, 2014, EV2). Demand for the good or service is 
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typically guaranteed. Under doctrinaire governments PSI firms likewise benefit from an ever-
increasing list of products to be produced. There is a nevertheless an important distinction: 
money is anything but passive within the outsourcing production regime. 
 
From the taxpayer’s perspective the contemporary outsourcing architecture is more 
dysfunctional in how it sets up corporate incentives than the Soviet system. Soviet SOEs had 
poor incentives to fulfil targets because wages were flat, political motivation was weaker than 
required and further undermined by corruption, and as workers if you fulfilled your target 
you were guaranteed a higher target the following year without reward (Myant, 1993:17). 
Under outsourcing, PSI firms are incentivized by their stock-holding executive pay structures 
and by the incompleteness of contractual specifications to sweat their contracts for profit, 
since beyond creative accounting measures their profit margin resides in fulfilling their 
contracts on the narrowest possible reading. At the same time these firms operate under 
powerful financial market incentives to maximize shareholder dividends even at the expense 
of productive reinvestment in the firm: the intense financialisation identified by multiple 
authors. Exceptionally sheltered from competition as they are public sector industry firms 
have proved more prone to financialisation than those more exposed (Haslam and Tsitianis, 
2018).  
 
The tougher any government tries to be in contract pricing the more damaging the 
consequences from margin-seeking by the firm are likely to prove. The 2018 collapse of the 
PSI multinational Carillion was not so much a freakish case but typical of PSI multinationals 
acting rationally under the prevailing incentive structure. Carillion’s management misjudged 
when the capital market would call ‘time’ but as Plimmer, Leaver, Haslam and Tsitianis have 
shown the entire sector has long tended towards deepening debt, self-cannibalizing payout 
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ratios and poor service provision so permissiveness in an expanding market has rather been 
the rule. Another conglomerate, Interserve, went into administration in March 2019.  
 
The standard defense of monopoly is that reputational effects discipline dominant firms 
against satisficing behavior. But with doctrinaire governments structurally dependent on the 
survival of dominant firms the reputational damage to poor providers is evidently nil. A 
Public Accounts Committee investigation found that Serco and G4S were awarded fourteen 
new contracts by five Departments worth £350 million even as they were investigated by the 
Serious Fraud Office for defrauding the Ministry of Justice. This happened though the Justice 
Minister, Chris Grayling, had committed to make no awards until the case was resolved: the 
MoJ was among the five (Plimmer and Neville, 2014). Interserve put out profit warnings in 
May 2016, October 2017 and November 2018 and was awarded £665 million in public 
contracts through 2017-2018 (GMB 2019).  
 
Sins of commission 
It is in the nature of a utopian and circular doctrine that orthodoxy is hard to recant in part, as 
the history of failed attempts to reform Leninism proved. Accept the realities of epistemic 
uncertainty and ontological indeterminacy and the micro-foundations of neoclassical 
economics fall apart. Once collapsed the concepts of power and interest must come flooding 
back in to a degree that would challenge the supply-side project as a whole. Reject general 
equilibrium and the chaos of the market returns, with all that implies for the necessary 
interventions of democratic politics and non-market institutions. Under neoliberalism as 
under Leninism the misapplied language of science must forestall application of the scientific 
method and the recalibration of theory based on evidence because the political stakes are 
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immediately high. What happens instead is the commission of increasingly paradoxical 
solutions.  
 
Following its highly critical 2014 inquiry, the cross-party Public Accounts Committee 
concluded that government should tighten the negotiation and cost component of contracts 
and improve the commercial and corporate expertise of the state. It also said that contractors 
needed to demonstrate a higher standard of ethics (HC777, 2014): a polite request that PSI 
firms become the purely honorable value creators of the Chicago school imaginary. These 
solutions failed to address the misconceptions of the basic model and hence the inescapable 
incompleteness of contracts for complex services, the financialisation and low 
competitiveness of PSI firms and the state’s dysfunctional structural dependency.  
 
However, if we stay within doctrine and consider what it would actually take to create 
competitive service markets and sustain them against their historical tendency to fail, or to 
somehow construct a bureaucratic analogue of a functioning market, the necessary 
administrative effort would make Brezhnev blush. The Institute for Government is a UK 
think tank that works closely with Whitehall on administrative reforms. To tackle the higher 
complexity of public service markets the Institute designed a ‘market stewardship 
framework’ and it is worth reviewing because it sets out what the most critical, i.e. second-
best world neoclassical economics could say about how to improve the situation. The IfG 
notes that whereas ‘Commissioning models often focus on understanding user needs and 
choosing the right providers market stewardship takes a broader perspective, considering how 
to set the rules of the market so that competition between those providers works effectively’. 
As such it seeks to complete the supposedly complete-able circle of market connections. 




 Determine the outcomes you are looking for, balancing the needs of all those affected 
by the service 
 Ensure there is enough money to pay for the services required 
 Ensure users have good information on which to base their decisions 
 Decide how to encourage new entrants into the market 
 Decide the criteria to use for selecting providers 
 Decide how to monitor performance, reward high performers and punish poor 
performers 
 Decide the process for switching providers if performance is not acceptable, while 
maintaining service continuity and standards (Institute for Government b.) 
 
While these remedies are consistent in theory they are extraordinary in their practical 
implications. In the first place, the requirement to ‘determine the outcomes you are looking 
for’ while ‘balancing the needs of all those affected by the service’ is driven by neoclassical 
logic more than by any realistic chance that this is possible. In the uncertain, complex and 
dynamic world in which we live the more government tries to comprehensively anticipate 
and quantify outcomes the more bureaucratically rigidified they are bound to be. Even 
without attempts to build ‘complete’ outcome indicators, contract theory has warned that 
where any agent has to perform a number of different tasks the effort will be allocated to the 
task most easily measured and hence rewarded. Increased productivity may duly come at the 
expense of output quality (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Around the problem of 
measurement Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) modelled how, in a world of incomplete 
contracts, the private sector’s incentive to reduce costs may overwhelm the incentive to 
improve quality if quality is difficult to measure (i.e. it is non-contractible). These are the 
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risks before you add contemporary financial market pressures for firms to pay out ever higher 
dividends. But the Soviets had identified these problems many decades before.  
 
The combination of cash limits and targets under communist planning created perverse 
incentives against innovation or performance optimization. Indeed, so long as the objective 
was to fulfil the agreed plan target there was no incentive to reach any level of output, sales 
or profit defined away from the sphere of bargaining (Myant, Ibid). Indeed the greater the 
clarity of the performance outcome, the lower the incentives for appropriate adaptation, 
initiative or innovation (Kornai, 1992, 118). The accurate planning of outcomes also depends 
on forecasts, which in turn depend on good information about the status quo, which takes us 
back to the false assumptions of ergodicity and that PSI firms will be nothing but honest and 
comprehensive in their reporting. The intensification of payment-by-results incentives in PSI 
firms and pseudo-synoptic outcome targets would take outsourcing only deeper into the 
private ‘orders of importance’, misreporting and widening discrepancies between production 
and allocation that characterized the Soviet planning system. As Kornai noted of the Soviet 
system, as the regulatory net was not dense enough to cope the holes had to be plugged with a 
succession of new regulations and so the bureaucracy only grew (Kornai, 1992: 130). The 
more comprehensive the UK’s imperative planning the more government agencies would 
have to develop synoptic planning and oversight capacity not just over but between all 
practically interdependent contracts. Again, this means only deeper entry into the planning 
world of the Soviet enterprise system, known latterly as ‘the economy of shortage’.  
 
In the Soviet Union the distorting effects of extensively determined target outcomes were 
long understood but criticism was impolitic until Stalin’s death. His successor, Nikita 
Khrushchev, had sought to reduce the number of indicators in national plans (1954-1956). 
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Subsequent discussions under Yevsey Liberman laid the groundwork for the Kosygin 
economic reforms of 1965, eventually thwarted by Brezhnev. These focused on the too 
numerous and often mutually contradictory success indicators to which Soviet enterprises 
were subject and tried to reduce targets and increase enterprise management flexibility 
(Laverty, 1982: 210-214). Since the Soviets abandoned synoptic enterprise targets over half a 
century ago as excessively bureaucratic it hardly smacks of scientific rationalism to find them 
at the methodological frontier of neoliberalism. 
 
To stay with the Institute’s list of stewardship requirements: to ensure enough money to pay 
for services is always important but it becomes harder with outsourcing given the 
asymmetries between supplier and buyer already discussed. As the Public Accounts 
Committee concluded, cost overruns are a chronic feature of outsourcing and by no small 
amount. In 2014 the National Audit Office concluded that the Aspire IT contract with Her 
Majesties Revenue and Customs had cost double the original contracting price and with 
double the profit for the contractors (Stokdyk, 2017). Without practical solutions to 
contractual power asymmetries this ratcheting up of costs is destined to continue, as it did 
under Leninism even without the systematic financial extraction. 
 
The stewardship requirement that users operate with good information is both misleading and 
more difficult than it sounds, but suffice it to say that for the market metaphor to add up the 
end-user ‘customers’ must be able to make an informed choice, and a choice has to exist, and 
this picture is disingenuous for the majority of outsourced services. To take just one example: 
disabled people who need to access their financial support are not shopping for a handbag. 
Guaranteed demand in the market for private goods is typically a recipe for poor service and 




The instruction to resolve information asymmetries between buyer and seller is a purely 
theoretical artefact. It flows from the neoclassical microeconomic logic of customer and 
seller in a competitive market for simple goods in a closed system. But again, the state is not 
a standard economic agent. It is typically mandated if not statutorily required to provide 
individual services while balancing the needs of all as relate to that service. To believe you 
can satisfy the state’s needs as a buyer by improving customer information you have to 
assume that the choices made by informed end users will be compatible with the wider social 
interest that the state is mandated to protect, but they rarely are. The problem is well 
illustrated by the chronically higher pupil exclusion rates of the outsourced Academy school 
system in England. Social policy research has long showed the welfare state to be accessed 
most effectively by the educated middle classes but is it progress to build this bias into the 
production regime? 
 
To continue down the Institute’s list: to encourage higher public service market competition 
the state should encourage entry not just by more large firms but also SME and third sector 
providers . Diversified contracting might be better managed by well-resourced local 
authorities around tasks that can be clearly defined (though likely poorer in the conditions of 
employment). However, to manage this centrally raises serious challenges around economies 
of scale, the bureaucratic costs of managing multiple small contracts and the capacity of 
smaller contractors to compete for, let alone manage larger contracts at a competitive price. 
There is also the risk to SME’s from failed tenders. As a form of stewardship this market-
making also requires analytical contortion. The rational state-as-standard-economic-agent (no 
longer the Leviathan of the original public choice diagnosis) now has to think not just about 
its immediate financial interest but has to build a better future market for itself as the 
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customer, regardless of the increase in logistical complexity and increased transaction costs 
from that. It also has to take on liabilities if those contractors fail. Imagine a market for bread 
where the condition for buying your daily loaf is an additional commitment to buy several 
days a week from multiple local artisanal bakeries at marginally higher immediate cost, 
where the service or total failure of any supplier means you become personally liable for 
supplying their fraction to the local population. Under such conditions the rational consumer 
would probably learn to bake their own.  
 
The difficulties likely to confront the last three requirements for effective ‘market 
stewardship’ have already been considered, but it is worth reflecting on the PAC’s 2014 
recommendations that government increase business expertise within the state. Indeed, a 
consistent government and parliamentary response to repeated contractual failures has been 
to blame the insufficient transformation of public employees into skilled market agents. With 
the private sector considered a reserve domain under neoliberalism, the state is the actionable 
sector left. The result however, is an increase in revolving-door appointments into the senior 
civil service; in-house expertise is lost as state capacity is outsourced more directly to private 
companies; civil servants and MPs who criticize the underlying doctrine on the basis of 
evidence are unlikely to advance in supply-sider governments and all the while important 
strategic information flows out asymmetrically to the private sector.  
 
It was particularly under Stalin that specialist knowledge was often screened out on the basis 
that experts were politically unreliable, though clearly his methods were uniquely brutal. Real 
authority was given instead to those who lacked competence but supported orthodoxy 
(Ellman, 2015): the opposite of scientific rationalism. In practice successive supply-side 
governments have continually endowed already failing PSI firms and the major accountancy 
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firms already proved incompetent (c.f. Carillion) with new contracts and policy-making 
influence. This is a degree of practical corporate state capture we only otherwise find in 
systems we categorize as highly corrupt. As in the Soviet system the result is an increase in 
both avoidable ignorance and systemic risk. While there has been no ‘terror’, people have 
died from neglect and satisficing corporate behaviour, for example in the fiasco of outsourced 
Personal Independence Payments for people with severe disabilities.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper contests the thesis that there is a constructive and socially organic trend towards 
scientific rationalism across the organizational board: a process that ‘rapidly turns the chaos 
surrounding human life into articulated uncertainties and structures the proper management 
of the risks involved’ (Bromley and Meyer 2013:370). It also challenges the public 
administration scholarship which maintains the supply-side shift is toward ‘a plural state, 
where multiple interdependent actors contribute to the delivery of public services, and a 
pluralist state, where multiple processes inform the policy-making system’ (Osborne, 2010: 
9). My argument is that these analyses mistake doctrinal promises for institutional reality. 
Supply-side reforms were the product of a radical political project conceived in utopian 
economics, not of a spontaneous and Enlightened cultural shift. Institutional convergence in 
the political economy of the state has duly failed to take a progressive scientific form. To the 
contrary, we have seen the most dysfunctional potentialities of states and markets grow from 
seeds sown in the hypothetical-deductive method of a pseudo- ‘governing science’. 
 
The resulting path dependencies are nevertheless transformative. The development of highly 
networked institutional fields of business around an expanding public service industry sector 
has been reinforced by rights-to-tender enforced by domestic and EU competition rules. This 
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has built a powerful lobby for further expansion of PSI ‘markets’ (as distinct from their 
deepening) even though the existing market is characterized by concentration, poor-to-
atrocious performance and increasingly Kafkaesque but inescapably lagging bureaucratic 
oversight. Given ongoing parallel cuts in core civil service capacity and bureaucratic 
Taylorist drives towards disaggregated administrative function, the paths are laid  for multi–
level institutional asymmetries in resources, information and political-economic power.  
 
More than any reversion to public provision or towards the methods recommended for an 
improved market stewardship, the central UK government’s solution under post-Financial 
Crisis ‘austerity’ has been to accept only the lowest cost outsourcing bids as a matter of 
course. This follows from the neoclassical emphasis on cost efficiency as ‘the correct line’. 
The result is a serious adverse selection problem. Given the objective difficulty of knowing 
what accurate pricing in complex and uncertain contracts might be, only companies with low 
regard for service quality and most determined to deploy a strategy of ‘hold up’ will 
rationally underbid for contracts when they have no guarantee they can stay within those 
margins. Carillion was just such a repeat ‘winner’ in competitive tendering and its liquidation 
alone cost UK taxpayers some £148 million (BBC 7 June 2018). 
 
The accelerated outsourcing of complex public service tasks has resolved the always 
hypothetical bureaucratic rent-seeking behaviors of public servants by creating still-
expanding opportunities for systemic rent-seeking by highly financialized large private 
business actors, while the taxpayer continues to foot the bill. Moreover, the new production 
regime is less covered by ethics codes and informational transparency than the public systems 
of before. The result, as in the Brezhnev era, is epic scope for moral hazard. Deteriorating 
service quality, rising cost and the demoralization of de-professionalized public servants are 
41 
 
baked in to the prevailing incentive system around outsourcing, as they were under Leninism. 
Rational people are incentivized to do damaging things, and conscientious people have to 
spend additional effort to limit the harm inflicted by the systems within which they work. To 
put this back into political cultural terms: if we insist on uploading a high modernist script of 
the political economy as predictable machine, actors as hyper-rational and society as 
amenable to codification, quantification, managerialism and target-setting, and if we insist on 
selling this to the public not as an ideological doctrine but as the technological frontier of 







Ackermann, F. 2002. Still dead after all these years: interpreting the failure of general 
equilibrium theory, Journal of Economic Methodology, 9 (2): 119-139, Section 4.1 
 





Alonso, J., J. Clifton and D. Díaz-Fuentes. 2013. Did New Public Management Matter? An 
empirical analysis of the outsourcing and decentralisation effects on public sector size, Public 
Management Review, 17 (5): 643-660  
 




Boli, J., Thomas, G.M., 1997. World culture in the world polity: a century of international 
non-governmental organization. American Sociological Review, 62 (2), 171–190. 
 
Bockman, J and Eyal. G. 2001. Eastern Europe as a laboratory for economic knowledge: The 
transnational roots of neoliberalism, American Journal of Sociology, 108 (2): 310-352 
 
Bovaird, B. 2016. The ins and outs of insourcing and outsourcing: what have we learnt from 
the last thirty years, Public Money and Management, 36 (1): 67-74 
 
Bowers, S. 2013. Public sector paid big outsourcing firms 4 billion pounds NAO report 




Bowman, A. et al. 2015. What a waste: outsourcing and why it goes wrong, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 
 
Bromley, P and Meyers, J.W. 2017. ‘‘They are all organizations’: The cultural roots of 
blurring between the non-profit, business and government sectors’, Administration and 
Society, Vol. 49 (7) 939-966 
 
Bromley, P and Meyers, J.W. 2013. The Worldwide Expansion of Organization, Sociological 
Theory 31(4): 366–389 
 
Cameron, D. Cabinet Office, Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon 




Christensen, J and N. Shaxson.  2016.  Tax Competitiveness – A Dangerous Obsession, in 
Pogge, T. and Mehta, K. Eds. Global Tax Fairness. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Crouch, C. 2015. The Paradoxes of Privatization and Public Service Outsourcing, Political 
Quarterly, 86 (December): 156-171 
 
Dixon, R. and C. Hood. 2015. A Government That Worked Better and Cost Less? Oxford: 
Oxford University Press  
 
Dunleavy, P. Margetts, H. Simon B. and J. Tinkler. 2006.  New Public Management is Dead - 
Long Live Digital–Era Governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
16 (3): 467-494 
 
Edwards, Lindy. 2007. How to argue with an economist, Cambridge University Press 
Ellman, M. 1978 The Fundamental Problems of Socialist Planning Oxford Economic Papers  
New Series, 30 (2): 249-262 
 
Ellman, M. 2015. Socialist Planning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Fuenfschilling, L. and Binz, L. 2018. Global socio-technical regimes, Research Policy, 47: 
735-749 
 
Fleetwood, S. 2017. The Critical Realist Conception of Open and Closed Systems, Journal of 




Giddens, A. 1991. Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age 
Stanford University Press 
 
GMB Union 2019, Interserve handed £660 million taxpayer contracts months before facing 
collapse, March 2019. Available at https://www.gmb.org.uk/news/interserve-handed-
%C2%A3660-million-taxpayer-contracts-months-facing-collapse, Accessed 16
th
 March 2019 
 
Gruening, G. 2001. Origins and Theoretical Basis of New Public Management, International 
Public Management Journal, 4:1-25 
 
Hart, O., Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny. 1997. The proper scope of government: theory 
and an application to prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:1127–1161 
 
Haslam, C and Tsitsianis, N. 2018. Written evidence to Government Inquiry: After 
Carillion: Public Sector Outsourcing and Contracting (LCCC 29 / HC 748) 
  
Hall, P. and Taylor, R. 1996. Political science and the three new institutionalisms, Political 
Studies, XLIV: 936-957. 
 
HC777. 2014. Public Accounts Committee. Contracting out Public Services to the Private 




HC884. 2016. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. Government’s spending with 
small and medium sized enterprises, 7
th




Hindmoor, A. Public Choice, in Colin Hay, Michael Lister and David Marsh. 2006. The 
State: Theories and Issues, Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Hellowell, M. and Vecchi, V. 2015. The non-incremental road to disaster? A comparative 
policy analysis of agency problems in the commissioning of infrastructure projects in the UK 
and Italy, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice. 17 (5): 519-532 
 
Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1991) Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive 
contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 
7(Special): 24–52  
 
Institute for Government a. Private Versus Public Markets, Institute for Government [online: 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/private-vs-public-markets 
 
Institute for Government b. The Market Stewardship Framework [online: 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/market-stewardship-framework 
 
Jensen, P. and R. Stonecash. 2005. Incentives and the efficiency of public sector outsourcing 
contracts, Journal of Economic Surveys, 19 (5): 767-787  
 
Kornai, J. 1992. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Oxford: 




Laverty, T. 1982. The Soviet Central Planning Process: New Methods and Continuing 
Problems, The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies; Fall, 7, 3 
 
Lawson, T. 2013. ‘What is this ‘school’ called neoclassical economics? Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, 37: 947-983 
 
Lazonick, W. 2015. The Theory of Innovative Enterprise: Foundations of Economic 
Analysis, The Academy-Industry Research Network, AIR Working Paper, #13 0201 
 
Lazonick, W. 2017.  Innovative Enterprise and Sustainable Prosperity. Paper presented to the 
Institute for New Economic Thinking, October 23
rd
, 2017, Edinburgh.  
 
Leaver, A. 2018. Outsourcing firms and the paradox of time travel, 12
th
 February, SPERI 
Political Economy Blog 
 
Le Grand, Julian. 1991 Equity and Choice: An Essay in Economics and Applied Philosophy. 
London: Harper Collins 
 
Loasby, Brian J. 2003. ‘Closed Models and Open Systems’, Journal of Economic 
Methodology, 10 (3):285-306  
 
McCloskey, D. 2005. The Trouble with Mathematics and Statistics in Economics, History of 




Meyer, J.W., Boli, J., Thomas, G.M., Ramirez, F.O., 1997. World society and the nationstate. 
American Journal of Sociology 103 (1): 144–181.  
 
Meyer, J.W., 1999. The Changing Cultural Content of the Nation-State: A World Society 
Perspective. State/culture: State-formation After the Cultural Turn.  
 
Meyer, J.W., Krücken, G., Drori, G.S., 2009. World Society: The Writings of John W. Meyer. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Meyer, J. W. 2010. World Society, Institutional Theories and the Actor, Annual Review of 
Sociology, 36: 1-20 
 
Mirowski, P. 1989. More Heat Than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature’s 
Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Mirowski, P and E. Nik-Khah. 2017. The Knowledge We Have Lost In Information: The 
History of Information in Economics, Oxford: Oxford University Press
 
 
Mouffe, C. 2011. On the Political, London: Routledge 
 
Myant, M. 1993. Transforming Socialist Economies: The Case of Poland and 




NAOa Government Commercial and Contracting: an overview of the NAO’s work – National 
Audit Office, Available at https://www.nao.org.uk/report/government-commercial-and-
contracting-an-overview-of-the-naos-work/ Accessed 18
th
 August 2016 
 
Osborne, S. (Ed). 2010. The New Public Governance: Emerging perspectives on the theory 
and practice of public governance. London: Routledge. 
 
Osborne, D. and T. Gaebler. 1992. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit 
is Transforming the Public Sector. NewYork: Addison-Wesley 
 





Plimmer, G. and Neville, S. 2014 ‘G4S and Serco won Whitehall work despite being ‘on 




Public Services and Commercial Union and the Tax Justice Network, HMRC: Building an 
uncertain future: Report, 2015 
 
Schmalensee, R. 1979. The Control of Natural Monopolies, Massachusetts: Lexington Books 
 








Veblen, T. 1989. Why is economics not an evolutionary science? Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 12 (4): 373-397 
 
Whitfield, D. 2014. UK outsourcing expands despite high failure rates, European Services 
Unit  
 
Whitefield, D. 2010. The dynamics of public sector transformation, Soundings, 46 (13): 99-
111 
  
Wilks, S. 2014 The public services industry: a constitutional blasphemy and a democratic 




 August 2018 
 
Williamson, O. edited by Chen, G. 2017. Contract, Governance and Transaction Cost 
Economics, World Scientific 
 
Williamson, O. 2002. The theory of the firm as governance structure: from choice to 
contract’, Journal of Economic Perspective, 16 (3) 171-195 
 
Williamson, O. 1993. Opportunism and its Critics, Managerial and Decision Economics, 14 
(2): 97-107 
 
Williamson, O. 1976. Franchise bidding for natural monopolies in general and with respect to 
CATV.’ Bell Journal of Economics 7 (1): 73–104  
50 
 
 
